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The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
is overburdened with a large volume of patent applications
while having limited resources to conduct patent examina-
tions. The patent examination process is too long and the
quality of issued patents is questioned by the public. I
propose to alleviate these problems by setting up predic-
tion markets for each pending patent. In these prediction
markets, traders buy and sell bets for the outcome of the
patent examinations. These proposed prediction markets
can create social value in two ways. First, they generate
forecasts about the likelihood of the pending patents be-
ing granted. Before the USPTO completes the examina-
tion, decision makers in need of information about the out-
come of the patent examination can use these forecasts to
make strategic decisions about research and development
plans, or investments in the technologies being patented.
Second, our proposal creates explicit incentives for public
participation in the patent examination process. The pro-
posed prediction markets reward traders with insights into
the pending patent, potentially motivating traders to inde-
pendently perform prior art search — a central task in eval-
uating patentability. The USPTO can then collect these
prior art for reference by giving small rewards to traders
who submit relevant prior art.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The patent system was set up to foster innovation by grant-
ing the inventors exclusive rights to extract monopolistic
profits from their own inventions for a limited length of
time (Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution).
Fundamentally, the patent system was based on the premise
that patents were truly “inventions” that deserve such privi-
lege. If a patent which was not truly innovative was granted
by the USPTO, the system would impose a dead weight
loss of efficiency on society due to the unjustified monopoly.
Over the recent decade, the USPTO’s performance in patent
examination has come under sharp criticism, especially the
long delays in the examination process and the low quality
of the patents granted.
Patent examination takes a long time, and the time it takes
has increased in recent years. In the last fourteen years,
the average pendency — the time in months from filing
to either issuance or abandonment — has been above 18
months. In 2008, the average pendency across all techno-
logical fields reached 32.2 months. In the field of Software
& Information Security, it has reached 42.4 months — more
than three years.1 The long pendency of patent examina-
tion exacerbates the patent hold-up problem, which occurs
when a firm has invested in developing a technology before
it discovers it infringes on another firm’s patent. As patent
examination has been largely a secret process in which only
the examiners and the applications are involved, the longer
the pendency, the more likely that a hold-up problem will
occur. Increased pendency also leads to high damages to the
firm being held-up.
There have been controversies over the quality of some high-
profile patents. A well-known one was Amazon’s one-click
shopping cart patent (US Patent 5,960,411), which was granted
by the USPTO in 1999[13]. One possible reason for the de-
cline of patent quality is that the USPTO is inundated with
patent applications and has limited resources. The USPTO
receives about 1,000 applications every working day [7, Ch.
5]. Each patent application receives about 20 hours of at-
tention on average from its examiners [12, 2], sometimes as
little as 8 hours [7, Ch. 5]. Further, patent examiners face
particular challenges in identifying non-patent prior art, due
to their lack of participation in the scientific community,
thereby not being up-to-date on where the latest inventions
are published [17].
1These data are published by the USPTO.
2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION INTHEPATENT
EXAMINATION PROCESS
Various reforms of the patent examination rules have been
suggested [19, 18, 7], most of which require a long time
to take effect. Entities other than the USPTO have ini-
tiated projects to bring the public into the patent exam-
ination process, achieving varying degrees of success. A
few examples are BountyQuest (2000 ∼ 2003), Wikipatents
(wikipatents.com) and Article One Partners [15].
My proposal is built on Peer-to-Patent (P2P), a pilot project
launched by the USTPO in 2007, to harness the “wisdom
of the crowd” to identify prior art for pending patent ap-
plications. For each patent application published on P2P,
anybody can post prior art or vote for the most relevant
prior art already posted. Four months after the listing of
a pending patent on P2P, the USPTO collects the submit-
ted prior art and considers them in their examination pro-
cess. P2P achieved moderate success during its first year
[1]. The first 27 patent examination decisions issued dur-
ing the pilot phase showed use of P2P submitted prior art
in nine rejections. Also, non-patent prior art was submit-
ted to the patent office through the P2P site, compensating
for the lack of expertise on the patent examiners’ part on
non-patent prior art search.
P2P has not gone without criticism [4, 5], particularly about
the incentives to participate in this community. Currently
P2P relies entirely on members’ altruism to voluntarily con-
tribute prior art, which is not a robust type of incentive.
Especially for experts in specific technological fields, the op-
portunity cost of time can be high.
3. CREATINGPREDICTIONMARKETS FOR
PATENT APPLICATIONS
I propose to implement a prediction market for each pend-
ing patent application. Such markets will reduce the long
pendency problem by providing early assessment of the like-
lihood of issuance of the patents. More importantly, they
will improve on the P2P project by creating explicit incen-
tives to participate in the prior art search.
In a prediction market participants trade securities whose
values depend on the outcome of future events. A predic-
tion market for a patent facilitates trades on the security
based on the USPTO’s action on that patent.Prices in such
markets fully aggregates all individual traders’ private pre-
diction [14], and reflects what the market as a whole“thinks”
the probability of the patent being issued is.
Prediction markets’ advantages in aggregating multiple in-
dividuals’ private predictions have been demonstrated in
a large number of markets. The Iowa Electronic Markets
(IEM) consistently outperforms opinion polls in predicting
the two-party vote shares of U.S. presidential elections [3].
In corporate settings, prediction markets outperform tradi-
tional forecasting methods such as face-to-face meetings [6]
and surveys [8].
3.1 The thin market problem
Thin markets are markets in which only a small number of
buyers or sellers are willing to transact at any given time.
As a result, the market price may not reflect the true rela-
tion between supply and demand. My proposed prediction
markets are likely thin markets, due to which the accuracy
of their predictions might suffer. First of all, a large num-
ber of patent applications are filed to the USPTO each year
[7]. There may be a large number of markets on the same
site simultaneously. It is likely that each market receives a
small number of trades. Second, most patents are in spe-
cialized fields, in which only a small number of experts have
sufficient insights to participate in trading. Third, know-
ing there might be expert traders in the market, non-expert
traders may hesitate to participate for fear of loss.
To avoid the thin market problem, I propose to implement
the prediction markets using the market scoring rule (MSR)
format, proposed by [9]. MSR based prediction markets
solve the thin market problem by having a market maker —
an automated trader who is ready to trade with anyone at
any time. Even if there is only one interested trader, she
can still trade with the market maker, and her private in-
formation can thus be elicited. This property is desirable in
specialized markets in which only a small number of experts
participate, such as our patent markets.
3.2 Submitting prior art
To encourage traders to submit prior art that they have
discovered, I propose to augment the prediction market with
a channel which allows submission of prior art. If someone
already has found some prior art, it costs her very little
to share it. The main incentive for conducting a prior art
search comes from the potential to profit in the prediction
market. Individuals can then be offered a small lump sum
of money for sharing the prior art they have already found,
if their contribution is cited by the USPTO.
This lump sum monetary reward may not even be necessary.
Individuals can benefit from submitting the prior art they
have discovered. Presumably, if an individual has discovered
a useful piece of prior art, she would be trading toward the
direction that the patent will be invalidated. If she submits
the prior art she discovered, there is a higher chance that
the USPTO will invalidate the patent, hence increasing the
chance that she will profit in the prediction market.
4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A few issues remain to be considered before my proposed
prediction markets can be implemented.
• Manipulation. Competitors of a patent applicant or
the inventors themselves may try to manipulate the
market price to influence the final patent issuance out-
come or to misguide each others’ decisions on research
and development activities. Both theory and empirical
evidence have show than attempts to manipulate the
market would only hurt the accuracy of the market
predictions temporarily, because the presence of ma-
nipulators creates opportunity for legitimate traders
to profit [10, 11].
• Disclosure. Some may worry that should a patent fail
to be granted, disclosure in a prediction market would
have given competitors opportunity to steal the inven-
tion. This worry is unfounded [16]. Currently, patent
applications are published after 18 months, granted
or not.2 Further, patent protection applies retrospec-
tively to the date of invention. Thus whoever tries
to steal the technology in the review process runs the
risk of being sued for infringement should the patent
be granted.
5. SUMMARY
In this paper, I propose to build a prediction market for each
pending patent application, to alleviate both the pendency
and the quality problem of the patent examination process.
Prediction markets are markets in which traders buy and sell
bets for the outcomes of future events. In our case, these
future events are the issuance or abandonment of the patent
application. These prediction markets generate an aggre-
gated prediction for the likelihood of each pending patent
being granted, before the USPTO makes a decision. It can
reduce the occurrence of hold-up problems and can also help
in incentivizing the public to participate in the prior art
search, thereby increasing the quality of issued patents.
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